Battle of the Bulge: 62nd Volks-grenadier Division

A companion post to the 18th VG Division.

Reference is MS # B-026, Report on the Ardennes Offensive. The 62 VGD by Brigadier-General Friedrich Kittel. This study. at 32 pages is one of the longer ones I have come accross and is divided into three sections along with fourteen sketches and one annex*. This post will transcribe items I believe will be interesting to war gamers and those military history enthusiasts who want to know about the why behind what happened.

* The fourteen sketches were not part of the scanned documents received from the U.S. National Archives.

Notes

All of the Foreign Military Studies B series manuscripts are the results of interviews with German leadership relying on memory after still ongoing dramatic events (imprisonment, interrigation, etc.).  Thes statement by Kittel that his "..memory has become greately weakend by the events of the last twelve months" could serve for many of the others.

The 62nd VG Div was assembled in the last weeks of November 1944 in the area of Wittlich-Cochem-Gerolstein, then about the beginning of December drawn forward to Preum-Schoenecken-Densborn-Lissingen (i.e. close to their offensive starting positions) and subordinated to LXVI Army Corps.

The mode of bringing up the artillery and the amount of ammunition was to be alloted were decided by the Corps, likewise the plan of fire to be followed, in which the wishes of the Division had been taken into consideration.

One regiment of the 18th VG was positioned on the right and on the left the 116th Pz Division. "These formations were only loosely connected with each other".

Kittel's manuscript is more chronological oriented than the 18th VG one. At some future date I would like to map it out.

The rifle companies amounted to fity men on average.

Tactics

American air superiority forced German troops to keep away from villages.

Artillery and antiaircraft troops were used to repel enemy large scale attacks allowing disrupted  German regiments time to reorganize at night.

Weather conditions were favorable up till 22 December.

The terrain required the employment of troops furnished with mountain equipment.

I. The attack from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944

The 62nd VG Div was to move forward at 0530 hrs and, after the taking of strongpoints from the enemy, was to break through into the area of Gross Langenfeld-Cigelscheid-Heckhuscheid as far as the vicinity of St. Vith.

The main objective was to attack over a wide front in order to tear to piece the American defens and to clear the road along Habscheid-Steinebrueck up to St. Vith. In addition:

a. Breakthrough into the wooded area of the switch line near Cigelscheid ('551') up to Winterspelt (center of gravity), taking the clearing south of Gross Langenfeld ('538 to 540') and the plateau of Heckhuscheid to prevent a flanking attack by the enemy along the road toward St. Vith.

b. Then, take the bridge at Steinebrueck by a detachemnt, especially made mobile for this purpose, together with an assault against St. Vith (railway station and western exit) and the taking of Gross Langenfeld and well as the gaining of the railway-bridge north-northwest of Thren. 

Clearning up the eastern band of the river Our in the sector of Auel-Steffelhausen and the building of a bridgehead in the directino of Maspelt. 

The positions of hte enemy as we saw it: Facing us, the 106th American Division arrived from England three months previously. Twenty to thirty battery positions among which was a heavy one. Several groups of field forifications, mines.

The telephone network of the West Wall was to be made available at the beginning of the attack. 

II. The defense from 29 December 1944 to 9 January 1945

Up to 5 January: "Over and over again wide gaps had appeared on the front, owing to the merely moderate fighting strength of the infantry, in the first three day s of the defense all reserve troops had to be commiteed in the sector of the 164th Regiment. The only people who still were not committed for combat were engineers and 'Panzerjaeger' whose guns had been damaged. 

It was now essential for our troops to prevent the enemy from gaining access to the Valley of Salm and advancing from Trois Ponts and across Garonne-Lart. 

At noontime on 9 January, the command was passed over to the 326th VG Div to which the remaining portions of the 62nd VG Div (minus the 183, 190 Regts and one artillery battalion) remained subordinated. 

III. The defense from 16 January 1945 to 27 January 1945

During the month of January, after bringing up approximately 800 men as replacemetns of which the greater number were very poorly trained, and by drawing upon the "Fuehrer" Rese3rve in the Field Replacement Battalion - again it was possible to reorganize units which were fit for use. 

A rest from fighting from eigth to ten days was badly needed. In general, a sufficient amount of material was still at hand, above all there was once more completed the issueance of ammunition, there was a pronounced lack of signal equipment (cables), assault guns and crews. 

Supply

No winter clothing or special outfit badly needed for fighting amidst mountains was available. Winder equipment was only envisaged for possible employment on the East and remained behind in the area of assembly.

Material had been brought up to strength except for field glasses; we had only twenty percent of what was needed in this respect.

The Antiaircraft Company never arrived up at the Division.

There was always an ample supply of motor fuel. Renewal of supplies took place with two 30 ton columns (horsedrawn) assisted by one 120 ton truck column (of which 60 percent ran on wood-gas).

Captured American matieral was not part of initial supply planning so that "considerable surpluses occasionally were in hand". Above all, material was captured at Steinebrueck, Galhausen and in the valley of Salm.

"Supply was always sufficient".

Outcome

Ignorance of the configuration of the attack zone and of the strength of any possible resistance by the enemy prevailed; no useful data acquired ground and air reconnaissance was at our disposal (compare this to the 18th VG where local reconaissance located a gap in the American lines).

Resistance by the 106th American Division offered on the first day was strong, contrary to what we had expected. From documents captured on the second day, the thoroughness of preparations in the defense area of Heckhusscheid-Winterspelt and Steinebrueck was noted.

Giving up the advantage of fire by beginning the attack at 0530 hrs; for fire not obsrved the available supply ammunition was much too low.

Since 22 December daylight, supply routes were under control of the American Air Forces. Theire effect on the attack formations was not worth mentioning! (believe Kittel did not mean that American air power was ineffective as in his chronology he doesn't mention air power much but did say that American air power was "very lively" on the 23rd and later mentioned it was one of the many difficult obstacles working against moving forces forward).

Battle of the Bulge: Report on German Army Group B Artillery

From the Foreign Military Studies series Manuscript #B-311 is the post-war report by Generalleutnant Karl Thoholte, General of the Artillery for Field Marshal Model's Army Group B. Some excerpts from the report below:

The artillery of the "Heeresgrupe" had no reserves at its disposal. Any new reinforcements were immediately spoken for and subordinated to Army units immediately.

Volks Artillery Korps

Comprised of only newly organized units.

The fighting strength was comparable to that of a weak artillery brigade.

Training and equipping of the troops had not been completed at the time of its commitment.

Only a portion was fully motorized.

Signal equipment was insufficient and only a few units had a battery with fire control equipment.

Due to the shortage of German guns some units were equipped with French and Russian guns. This caused supply problems in which there were too many types of ammunition to bring forward.

Actual combat strength of Volks Artillery Korps units was from sixty to seventy percent of normal.

Heeres (regular Army) Artillery Units

Mainly composed of heavy field howitzer batteries and ordinary howitzer battalions (which lacked adequate towing capabilities).

Actual combat strength was about eighty percent of normal.

Mortar units were well equipped but were constantly short of ammunition.

Fighting strength for mortar units was one hundred percent.

General Observations

The total number of gun barrels employed in the Ardennes Offensive was about nineteen hundred and each army had about six hundred guns.

The late date at which the artillery was organized caused difficulties.

In Thoholte's opinion the artillery assigned to the offensive "was sufficient for the mission allotted it" but ammunition supply capabilities were lacking.

Observation detachments arrive late and reconnaissance for the offensive was not adequately conducted in order maintain the illusion that any German preparations detected by the Americans were for defensive purposes only. Additionally, there was "no air reconnaissance whatsoever".  The results was that the strength and organization of American artillery remained uncertain until the offensive started.

There were plans for two "Carl" guns (600 mm) and a 305mm howitzer battery for bunker busting missions.  Thoholte believes the Carl guns never were brought up in time.

Probably not in the context of the Ardennes Offensive Thoholte mentioned the promise of "Dora" guns (800 mm) but considered that both the Dora and Carl guns failed to be useful on either front and the ammunition they consumed "in no way paid back their actual effect". Railway artillery, being bound to the rails and sensitive to air attacks "was never capable of effective use".

Perception of American Forces

American artillery had no serious effect on either the 6th or 5th Panzer Army. Observed enemy fires: "..always come from a few batteries all aiming at one target and despite the great amount of ammunition they consumed - they were not effective enough to bring our attack to a standstill".

Unobserved enemy fire (i.e. fire according to plan): "usually concurred at given times and location and was so mechanical in manner that we were able to avoid it after getting used to it somewhat".

The American fire directed by air observation was exceptionally good. Any target aimed at by this method "was usually knocked out".

American radio communications between spotting aircraft and ground troops could often be intercepted and their intended targets warned in time.

American artillery units did not carry out any ground work to reinforce their positions but Thoholte states that lack of ammunition prevented the Germans from taking much advantage.

"The critical moment during the attack came on the third day of action. The American air force, namely, was master of the skies".

Battle of the Bulge: 18th VG Division

A continuation on research into the Volks-grenadiers during the Ardennes Offensive.

I found reference to "Manuscripts of German Commanders" which were prepared for the Historical Division, U.S. Army Europe. The data gathered was taken from interviews held immediately after the war or from interrogations of prisoners.

In all, there were around 2,500 studies (not all translated into English) written between 1945 and 1959.  The studies were organized into nine series and I was able to locate two "B-Series" manuscripts (narrative histories of units on the Western Front) of the two VG Divisions in the St. Vith area of operations:

18th Volks Grenadier Division (1 SEP 1944 - 25 JAN 1945) by Oberstleutnant Dietrich Moll (MS# B-688)

and

462nd Volks Grenadier Division (12 NOV - 13 DEC 1944) questions presented to Generalleutnant Heinrich Kittel (MS# B-079).

The 462nd VG manuscript concerns the Germans defense of Metz but I will look into it for any insight on the VG formations.

MS#B-028 which is General Frierich Kittel's 62nd Volks Grenadier Division, 16 DEC 1944 to 27 JAN 1945 is on order and I'll post on the 62nd VG after receipt.

Credit for access to the 18th VG manuscript goes to the Sturmpanzer web site which is filled with excellent resources and I only wish I could find the equivalent for the Red Army.

Notes for the 18th VG Division

Oberstleutnant Dietrich Moll (rank equivalent to Lt. Colonel) was the 18th VG's Operations Officer. General Brandenberger (commander of the German Seventh Army) reviewed the report and an appendix is dedicated to his perspective on the narrative and issues raised by Dietrich Moll.

Activated 19 December 1944 near Kolding, Denmark the division was allocated a cadre of 2,500 from the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division and 3,000 men from other Luftwaffe and Navy sources. The manuscript describes how another 5,000 mean were drafted from the "indispensables" or men that had occupied positions vital to the war industry.  At least for the 18th VG, their cadre did not include many recent draftees so the age of the average Volks-grenadier was older than other field units. Despite the older age many of the officers and men had not seen much action (the exception being the veterans from the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division) and few men "had campaign ribbons or decorations". Most tellingly, the manuscript states that he original Luftwaffe officers and NCOs "seem to lack concern for their men" and "nearly all of the originally assigned Luftwaffe officers proved unreliable and had to be replaced".

It seems that the better weapons available to the 18th, to include infantry assault rifles, did not fully compensate for a reduced numerical strength (e.g. regiments reduced to two, vice three infantry battalions).

The division's anti-tank capability was lacking, due to a paucity of AT guns and panzerfausts issued.

Tactics

• ..."higher headquarters should be reminded that the mobility of a unit is wholly determined by the rate of march of its infantry". Some units were provided with bicycles, but lack of spare parts and sever weather and terrain denied any appreciable increase in the unit's mobility rate.
• "Unceasing combat reconnaissance" to make up for the German inferiority in the air.  This paid dividends at the start of the offensive as the 18th had located gaps in the lines of the 106th Infantry Division.
• Artillery would constantly charge firing positions and fired single rounds from roving guns to prevent enemy counter-battery fire.
• The Model 44 automatic rifle "proved an excellent weapons" and the telescopic sight rifle was also classified as good but "not used enough owing to the lack of trained marksmen".
• The panzerfaust "proved an ideal weapon" for patrols and in close combat but the "bazooka" was not used in defense as it was "susceptible to damage from rust and sand".  My sense (later confirmed) is that the manuscript uses bazooka and panzerfaust interchangeably and does not refer to using captured American bazookas in defense. I have to wonder why rust and sand didn't impact offensive use but defensive use only.  My guess it that defensive use refers to strategic defense and not tactical defense situations, that is, the panzerfaust was good for combat operations but only for a limited amount of time and if kept in the field long, would become unreliable.
• Medium and heavy mortars were good for defense, but were used sparingly due to lack of ammunition.

The Offensive

• Based on the lack of response from the American artillery (no barrage fire and only scattered fire starting after 08300, the 18th had caught the defenders by surprise.
• The first break through of American lines was reported by noon. Initial fight was conducted mostly by infantry and assault guns as the German's own anti-tank defenses prevented vehicles from crossing the bring and heavy support weapons had to be carried by hand.
• By nightfall the number of casualties "was reasonable" and the number of American prisoners was low.

The initial American defense and eventual surrender of the 422nd and 423rd Regiments can be summed up by this passage:

"The behavior of the enemy on the second day of the attack was wholly incomprehensible. In the main, he did nothing. However, localized resistance was stubborn and eliminated only with difficulty. That is to say, the Americans fought bravely wherever fighting actually occurred. But their tactics were unsystematic."

Supply

• Lack of trucks.
• Ammunition supply "generally fair", with expenditure controlled by higher headquarters (such control judges as "hardly compatible with a conduct of battle..").
• Serious shortages of mines, signal and tracer ammunition, and radio equipment.
• Food, with few exceptions, was plentiful.
• Supply of rough fodder for horses, "was wholly inadequate".
• During the battle "no reissue of weapons or equipment".

Outcome

The smashing of the 106th Infantry Division by the 18th VG* was a terrible defeat but the American defense of St. Vith and the denial of the vital road junction for over 5 days contributed to the ultimate failure of the Ardennes Offensive. 

This passage from the manuscript provides some insight:

"The division's objectives were too distant. With an attack zone 19 kilometers wide and with only six available battalions, the destruction of an enemy at least equally strong was a task requiring the utmost skill. 

Perhaps, St.Vith would have been captured sooner if a motorized division, ably led and able to cling to the heels of the retreating enemy, had been moved forward through the gap which the division first opened. Whether the Fuehrer Escort Brigade had the march discipline, the drive, and the flexible system of command needed to execute this mission is a moot question".

Looks like I'll need to look into the Fuehrer Escort Brigade in a future post...

* The 424th Regiment stayed in the fight and acquitted itself well..

By 6 January, the 18th VG was depleted.  On 29 January Moll states there were only 138 men assigned as infantry holding a 9 kilometers wide sector.

The Americans

The manuscript not only gives insight into a VG regiment but also their American foes. American prisoner's physical stamina is compared favorably "with the Germans as they were prior to 1941".

American reliance on artillery, tactical excellence but also predictability is discussed:

• Prior to the offensive - "The American defense consisted largely in laying down more or less constant artillery fire".
• A set pattern of targets were taken under fire but any deviation from this patter indicated a change of units.
• The accuracy of unobserved fire on the 18th's supply installations and road junctions "indicated that the enemy had skilled computors (not computers) and a method of accurate ballistic correction" which was "ofent adjusted by artillery observation planes".
• Fire began every day at 0800 and ceased at 1700, with only a few rounds fired during the night.

More predictability:

"Artillery reconnaissance planes were active after 0900, disappearing for one hour at noon, and then building up to highest activity in the late afternoon, to disappear finally at 1700.".  To be fair, these were probably the only reliable daylight hours during the winter months.

From the manuscript

Battle of the Bulge: Approaching St. Vith Part II

Last post's screen shot was from turn 27.

Turn 34 (7 turns or around 24 - 32 hours later)

1: Kampfgruppe Telkamp initially attempted to reach Rodt and cut the highway to St. Vith.  The 7th Armored was there in force as can be seen by the many wrecks.  I destroyed a company of Shermans but at great cost and decided to head directly for St. Vith instead.

2: 7th Armored holding a line just north of the paved highway. I don't have enough force to attempt to cut the road and simultaneously advance towards the vital VP hexes in St. Vith

3: The surrounded remnants of what Intel is telling me is the 424th Infantry Regiment (playing "fog of war" I cannot access unit information on my opponent's troops but I believe this is the 424th as it starts the game in St. Vith along with a couple companies of engineers).

The enemy held a strong position on this ridge and was dug in but my troops were able to remain in LOS and call in heavy rocket fire, disrupting the enemy and allowing them to be encircled.

4: Steinbruck and the 500 vp hex is just south west of the numeral 4.  My 62nd VG Division is slowly approaching.

Remember that historically, the 424th Infantry Regiment was on the front line, south of its sister 422nd and 423rd infantry regiments which were quickly surrounded and destroyed. The 424th was able to pull back to St. Vith, and then forced back further west before taking part in the eventual counterattack.  They have an interesting history and will rate their own dedicated post.

Turn 38

St. Vith will not fall easily.  After overrunning the 424th I thought I may do the same to isolated defenders at St. Vith but the 7th Armored Division is here in force, along with quite a few engineers that cause havoc with my panzers at close quarters. They hold a continuous line and I hear armor behind their lines waiting to strike.

There is nothing to it but fight a battle of attrition: move forward, take the heavy op fire, try to force the defenders back so their artillery will not devastate my advance, and if I fail in that, lay smoke and hope I can hold on until my artillery takes effect.  Even the Tigers (on the right of the screen shot) are taking casualties from engineers fighting in the town hexes.

Battle of the Bulge: Approaching St. Vith

German Forces Approach St. Vith.

Newly captured Schönburg is on the far right of the screen shot below.  I recommend clicking on the picture below to see the detail. A clump of volks-grenadier stragglers, artillery and transport, clog the narrow Schönburg streets.

A mix of engineers, volks-grenadiers and the Führerbegleitbrigade have entered the first line of woods after capturing Setz.  I thought the enemy would make a stand but, so far, no opposition.

In the top left, north west of St. Vith, Kampfgruppe Telkamp approaches.  This battle group was part of the 9th SS Division and was involved with the action around St. Vith.  If you look closely you can see the wreck of a scout car that was hiding in the woods. The scouts were from the 7th Armored Division who stood in the way of the 9th SS Panzer Division, preventing it from surrounded St. Vith from the north and north west.

Historically, the 9th SS struck further to the west, (off the map above), around Poteau. In this scenario I just have Kampfgruppe Telkamp and by playing past versions of this scenario I found that despite packing a punch, attacking the 7th Armored Division alone is extremely costly, therefore, I head directly for St. Vith to join up with their comrades approaching from the east.

Kampfgruppe Telkamp Links

There's not much information online on Kampfgruppe Telkamp.  In fact, when searching I found that an old "during action report" relatively high up in the search results (click more results to find 1st Chronicles post).  The report was from a very early version of this scenario and I'm glad to say, the Germans may take St. Vith this time.

Not much but a book available online on the 9th SS Panzer Division and an article on the 9th at Globeatwar.com. Both the book and article focus on the war history of the 9th SS and there is not a lot of detail on the Bulge.

Battle of the Bulge: German Medical Care

My main source is the German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945 by Alex Buchner (cheaper options available on Ebay, or at the Barnes and Noble marketplace).

The Handbook lacks Battle of the Bulge specific information but the Back-Line Services chapter has sections on medical and veterinary services. This chapter is very interesting as I have never thought about the need for a divisional butcher company ("capable of slaughtering 15 cattle, 120 hogs or 240 sheep and making up to 3000 kilograms of sausage daily").

Organization

Medical units were divided into troop and divisional services. Troop medical services began with a trained medic assigned to each platoon, and a medical NCO and soldier assigned to the company HQ. The company medics usually worked with the battalion surgeon during a battle and along with auxiliary stretcher bearers were responsible for taking the wounded from the battlefield.

In combat, the hope was that a wounded soldier could be taken off the battle field to a "nest" or collection point, immediately behind the front line. There first aid would be given and transportation to a troop dressing station (TVP) where the battalion surgeon provided "the first professional care" to include bone-setting, stopping of heavy bleeding, serums and other medicines, etc but not surgery.

Transition to divisional care took place at "wagon stops" where troops would be transported from TVPs to a main dressing station (HV-Platz), usually located three kilometers behind the front here.
Here we get our first insight into the difference between U.S. and German medical care.  The Americans relied on jeeps to transport the wounded off the battle field while the designation of "wagon stop" evokes a slower method.

Each division had a medical company, organized in three platoons and other units. All specifics on equipment and number of personnel have to be view as taken from the standard organizational chart and was probably the "best case" for actual medical support resources available:

• 1st Platoon - Stretcher-bearer platoon. Led by a specialist. Collect troops from the battlefield and set up the wagon stops.
• 2nd Platoon - Main dressing station platoon. Commanded by a surgeon. Responsible for setting up the HV-Platz. They had "a complete operating facility packed in portable containers, with full lighting and a light field X-ray machine". 
• 3rd Platoon - Replacement platoon. Commanded by a surgeon (when possible). Helped the other two platoons and set up collecting stations for slightly wounded or sick men.
• Field Pharmacy (transported in 3.5 ton truck). 
• Dental Station (dentist and assistant)..
• At least one cook capable of preparing special rations for patients.
• Two ambulance columns. Each column had three platoons (40 men and 12 ambulances, two cars and 8 sidecar motorcycles). These columns were used to transport wounded from the Hv-Platzs to field hospitals or other medical facilities.

In addition, the motorized divisional field hospital was manned by five surgeons, assisted by 66 men. Transport included 6 cars, 11 trucks and two motorcycles with sidecars. This level of resources allowed for the care and treatment of up to 200 to 300 patients. The book describes how the field hospitals were usually insufficiently manned and could be ineffective in their mission due to the frequents moves required to stay out of danger. Under a reorganization for infantry divisions in 1943 section the book lists divisional medical services as:

• 1 medical company, horse-drawn
• 1 medical company, motorized
• 1 ambulance company

Long term care and care for the severely wounded would be dependent on local medical infrastructure in the general vicinity or transport back to Germany. 

Veterinary Services

For an army dependent on horse drawn transport (each division had over 5000 saddle and draft horses), veterinary services were as vital to the mission as regular medical services for the humans. 

The veterinary organization consisted of regimental and battalion vets subordinate to the divisional staff. The regimental, battalion and unit vets were located "on the spot where the horses were" so they performed their duties in dangerous locations. .  

Each division had "about thirty" veterinary officers of different skill levels with a strong contingent of reservists called up from rural areas. 

The book doesn't make clear how a veterinary company related to the regimental and battalion veterinarians so I'm guessing it was a divisional asset.  The Veterinary Company consisted of:

• Six vet officers
• 24 NCOs
• 203 enlisted
• 88 horses
• 21 wagons
• 1 car 
• 9 trucks
• 1 solo and 2 sidecar motorcycles.

The Veterinary Company was responsible for setting up a collecting centers where wounded and sick animals would receive their "first adequate treatment", a small field hospital along with an area to quarantine horses suspected of contagious diseases and a supply section where healed horses were returned to service or new horses from army remount stations were cared for then distributed.

Hiwis (Soviet prisoners that volunteered to help the Germans) contributed greatly to the veterinarian services. Readers may remember this post in which a Hiwi reenactor is caring for a horse.

After years of reading military history, years of wargaming and knowledge of the vital role horse transport was to the German Army I never gave thought to the fact that:

"Normally every company, battery or unit had a blacksmith or blacksmith NCO.  In the battalions and similar units, and in the veterinary companies, there were master blacksmiths..". The blacksmiths often helped as veterinary assistant giving first aid and care of sick and wounded animals.

Impact of Allied Air Superiority

Foreign Military Studies  MS # B-048's titled Mission of the Chief Army Medical Officer of the Fifth Panzer Army reveals the impact of Allied air superiority towards German medical care:


- Throughout 5th Panzer Army's area of operations a significant portion of casualties, military and civilian, were caused by strafing airplanes, requiring an increased number of surgeons.

- River crossings for medical ferries were located away from troop ferries and marked by "appropriate flags".  River crossings and their associated traffic jams were prime targets for Allied aircraft.

- There were shortages of ambulances and gasoline and sometimes the shortages were exacerbated by air attacks on the ambulances ("frequent enemy air attacks, even on vehicles bearing the Red Cross emblem"). It seems that Allied aircraft attacks on medical installations were "probably unintentional" and "Generally, stations marked with Red Cross emblems were spared by the enemy" but the report states there were many cases aircraft attacking ambulances in broad daylight.

- Air attacks on transportation infrastructure (highways, ferries, overpasses, railways and rail stations) effected the evacuation of wounded to the rear and medical supplies to the front. 

Here is the final paragraph of the report:

"As a result of enemy air superiority, losses were particularly high, the performance of medical duties particularly difficult, and the conditions for adequate treatment of wounds and recovery particularly unfavorable. On the German side, there was no shortage of war-experienced medical officers, and to the end there generally was no lack of medical supplies, but circumstances beyond out control dealt the heaviest blows. Up to 500 casualties passed through collecting stations daily. The job done by the surgeons, who often kept on operating for 16-18 hours practically without pause, could not be surpassed". The same applies to the accomplishments of the medical officers and medical personnel, who worked day and night, and in particular to the performance of the courageous ambulance drivers".

Battle of the Bulge: U.S. Medical Care

Evacuation by 1/4-Ton Truck in deep snow in the vicinity of Monschau and illustrates Medical Detachment personnel of the 393d Infantry Regiment, during the Battle of the Bulge. Picture from 324th Medical Battalion Unit History

U.S. Medical Care

Battle of the Bulge Memories needs to be added as a permanent link to the index as this is the second time the site has come up in searches for relatively obscure information.

This article, Medics in the Bulge by Ralph Storm provides a great overview, not only of medical care during the battle, but also throughout the European Theater of Operations (ETO).

Storm's article goes beyond medical unit organization and front line procedures with extended sections on typical medical cases such as trench foot, cold injury and combat fatigue.

A quote from medic Keith Winston of the 100th Division (note: the 100th ID was not at the Bulge but held the line to the south as other divisions were rushed north)  on casualty evacuation under ideal conditions:

 "A boy gets hurt on the line.  Within a minute or less a telephone message is sent back to our forward aid station, a distance of 300 to 1000 yards from the front, where a Sergeant and four litter bearers are always on hand.  They rush right up to the line with a litter." First aid with an emphasis on stopping bleeding and hopefully by the time the patient was stabilized another litter team will have arrived to take the wounded to " where a jeep can travel... anywhere from 25 to 300 yards, depending on conditions."

The Medics definitely were earning their combat pay even when they were not entitled to it until early 1945!

Aid stations were located 1 to 3 miles behind the front line, did not have beds and only had the bare essentials. A physician would look at the patient who was then sent to a clearing station farther to the rear with a note from the physician on a card, attached to a button hole in the patient's coat.

Be sure to read the piece on litter carrying in the article.  It is in the aid station section and describes the exhausting work.  During emergencies it was not unknown for the battalion surgeons would act as litter bearers.

 The clearing stations would probably still be in artillery range of the enemy but this was the spot that any emergency operation would be performed. Finally, the wounded are taken by ambulance to an evacuation hospital, "where first class attention is administered".

During the Bulge many of the hospitals had to constantly move. The 130th General Hospital at Ciney, Belgium (northwest of Bastogne), was caught up in the fighting just as they were moving out.

Again, I highly recommend this article as it contains a wealth of information and interesting insights such as how penicillin could be extracted from the urine of patients and reused and despite the U.S. Army being segregated a decision was made not to set up segregated hospitals due to the impracticability and redundancy.

Summary of Winston's description:

Front line medics:

• stabilize until litter team can pick up and carry to where a jeep can pick up the wounded.

Aid Stations:

• fist look by a physician and initial diagnosis performed.

Clearing Stations:

• emergency operations performed.

Evacuation Hospital:

• "where first class attention is administered"
• If a patient needed more than six months of care he was sent back to the U.S.  Less than six months, he would be kept in theater for a quicker return to his unit.  During the Bulge this time was shorted to four months (to be sent back to the States) due to the surge of casualties. 

Warfarehistorynetwork.com has a good article on the U.S. Army Medical Corps in WW2 and mentions Portable Surgical Hospitals (PSH's). Originally, I thought PSH's were the clearing stations described by Keith Winston but they were a little more specialized.

 From the article:

"These spartan PSH tents were set up to accommodate major surgery, sometimes so close to the front that they were under fire from the enemy. They retreated or advanced rapidly with the fortunes of war. A staff of a fully equipped PSH could disassemble and load tents, equipment, and personnel onto waiting trucks within two hours"

The "ideal" process for treatment in the Warfarehistory's article summarized:


Front Line medics:

• Treat where the wounded man fell.  
• This usually consisted of a shot of morphine to prevent him from going into shock, some sulfa powder to keep his wounds from getting infected, and a rapid bandage to stop the bleeding.

Battalion Aid Station:

• "perhaps a kilometer behind the lines". 
• Thorough first aid, diagnosis, and serious injuries stabilized. 

Collecting Station:

• Further back from the aid station.
• Serious casualties sent to a PSH (if available) or sent the wounded to a clearing station that consisted of 12 doctors and 96 enlisted men.

Clearing Station:

• "major medical surgeries could be performed in sanitary conditions before the worst cases were sent to an evacuation hospital."

Portable Surgical Hospital:

•   Major surgery, probably allowing for more complicated cases than a clearing station.
•   Sometimes located in range of enemy artillery.

Evacuation Hospital

• 12-15 miles behind the lines.
• "Seriously wounded were shipped to a general hospital as near to the home of the individual soldier as possible."

Overview

Compared to conditions in WW1 the mortality rate for a wounded soldier fell from a little over 8% to 3%.  During the Civil War the mortality rate was as high as 25%.

I'll begin reading and try to find information allowing a comparison between medical care available to the Germans at the Bulge.  To help this comparison any suggestions and comments are welcome.

Related Links

Link to the Bulge series index.

324th Medical Battalion unit history, from training to deployment and their actions during the Bulge.

Recollections from nurse Dorothy Steinbis Davis who served in a field hospital in the European Theater of Operations with the 7th Army.

Battle of the Bulge: Game Review

After entering some Bulge related search term I came across this game review for Shenandoah Studio's Battle of the Bulge.

Armchair General's verdict is that the game is a fun, fast playing, simulation that is easy to lean but challenging to master but suffers from unrealistic combat results and "at times", simplistic game play.

Overall they state the game is great value for the price and I have to agree.  I have went through the tutorial, played against the computer in the Race to the Meuse scenario and the Battle of the Bulge full game.

My positive ratings:

• Great user interface and menus. 
• Quick to learn.
• Basic game but many strategic truths hold true.
• Nice map.

Negative:

• Sometimes seems like the game is more puzzle solving than a historical simulation. 
• Activation method for units is all or none for all units in one sector. 
• Nice map but one needs to zoom in and study to see the vital bridges.
• AI can be fooled but only have experience against the "Montgomery" AI. 

Game play consists of activating units in a sector. In the screen shot below I have activated the units in the Losheim Gap and they are about to overwhelm the 14th Armored Group. The 106th Infantry Division is located just east and starts almost surrounded by the German player, sharing the Schonberg sector with the 18th and 62nd Volks-Grenadier Divisions. .

An aspect of the game I like is they do give due consideration to terrain effects.  The 106th may be caught by surprise but they are more than a match in defense against the two VG Divisions. I do think that Shenandoah doesn't give the 18th VG Division the respect it deserves but I think they have this right in that an attack against an infantry division defending in the woods will be a costly affair.  Best for the German player to surround the 106th and wait for lack of supply to take effect. I did in the long game and on the 19th, they were easily captured; a historical result.

The game does bring home the fact that this was a lost battle from the beginning.  I actually reached and crossed the Meuse River and won the long game but could only cross with one Panzer Division and the enemy was threatening my flanks. Patton had a point when he said he wished the Germans would go all the way to Paris...

Combat resolution is simple and almost bring the same level of excitement as rolling dice. Here I have three Panzer Divisions attacking American armor in the Bastogne sector.  Note the small tree and house icons just to the left of the American armor icons.  They are hard to spot as they have a grey "bullet" mark.

Each "pip" or the little white boxes in the unit icons gets one "die" to roll during combat.  In this case the Germans are in the process of "rolling" 17 virtual dice. They already scored two hits but those hits were absorbed by the tree (defenders in forest) and the house (defending in the town) but now the Allied armor is starting to take damage with one hit (removal of one of the pips).

The game is just under $10 and is available on Steam.  I'd class it as a great introductory war game, especially for iPad gamers. I heard that it sold very well with that set.

Here is the Shenandoah Studio FB link. They have a web page but I didn't have luck connecting.

This is one post in a series covering military history and gaming aspects of the Battle of the Bulge.
An index to there series is available by following this link.

Battle of the Bulge: Fighting in Bleialf

This post is a supplement to Part II of the Bulge Series and compliments the one on the fight for Krewinkle and Afst.  The supplements are necessary as the scenario being used as the vehicle to study this battle either starts after the fighting has ended (Krewinkle and Afst) or has the front line further east at game start (Bleialf).

The game map from Part II is copied below to remind the reader on the location of the villages.

With Krewinkel and Afst taken in the north, followed by the loss of Auw and Roth, and a successful assault on Bleialf, the encirclement of the 422nd and 423rd infantry regiments begins.

Battle of the Bulge: Fighting in Krewinkle

Introduction

This post is a supplement to Part II of my Bulge series and highlights the fighting for Krewinkle and Afst, a rare American success on the morning of 16 December but not simulated in the scenario.

Situation Maps

This screen shot from an earlier version of the scenario.  Manderfeld is west and in the game we are playing the Germans start off map to the west.

The map below is an update from this post showing German positions at the end of Turn 1, adding place names for Afst and Krewinkel.  The Americans are long gone and Tigers roll through.

Battle of the Bulge: Weapons of the 106th Infantry Division

Just like its Volks-Grenadier counterpart, this post will be updated with more weapons as the series moves on.

                                                       Infantry Weapons

This link describes what is on display at various museums around the Ardennes and I will use this as a reference until I find a reference for the 106th's specific weapons. 

M3 /M3A1 Sub-machine gun

M3/M3A1 from Infogalactic article.

The M3 was developed using a design study of the British Sten and the first models were in development at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.  The development project was then given higher priority and the M3 rushed into production. Nicknamed the "Grease Gun" due to its unusual design the newly issued guns were easily damaged, especially the cocking handles breaking off and bending stocks. The M3A1 was produced in 1944 using a simpler design that was easier to use (for example getting ride of the easily broken cocking
handle). 

The M3 used a 9mm round, weighed 4.65kg/10.25 pounds and had a relatively low rate of fire at 350-450 rpm. The M3A1 was phased out of front line service by 1957 but remained in inventory for tank and truck drivers up to 1992.

Front line troops in Europe preferred the Thompson M1 or captured MP38 or MP40 guns allowing insight into its effectiveness versus other infantry weapons.

Bazooka

Note: I cannot recall first person accounts of bazookas being used by 106th ID infantrymen so, for now, listing the bazooka as a comparison with the VG's Raketenpanzerbüschse (Rocket tank rifle) 54.


First used in North Africa, this simple weapon (open tube and electrical firing mechanism) was used by the Germans to develop their Raketenpanzerbüchse after one was captured on a North African battlefield in 1943. Despite the Germans answering with larger caliber weapons, the bazooka used the 60mm caliber rocket to the end of the war.

The length of the tube was 1.384 m / 4ft 6.5in and weighed 6.01 kg / 13.25 lb while each rocket weight 1.54 kg / 3.4lb.

Maximum range was 594 meters.

                                                  Overall OOB for the 106th

Note: to be used to add equipment notes to units.
From Nafziger OOB (944ULAA).

106th Infantry Division: Major General A.W.Jones

422nd Infantry Regiment 
423rd Infantry Regiment
424th Infantry Regiment     

589th Field Artillery Regiment 
590th Field Artillery Regiment 
591st Field Artillery Regiment   
592nd Field Artillery Regiment     

81st Engineer Combat Battalion
820th Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed) 
14th Cavalry Group, Mechanized         

275th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
634th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion 
563rd AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion     
333rd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers)
559th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm guns)   
561st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm guns)     
578th Field Artillery Battalion (8" howitzers) 
740th Field Artillery Battalion (8" howitzers) 
770th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers)
771st Field Artillery Battalion (4.5" guns)       
965th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers) 
969th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers) 

Index to the Battle of the Bulge, V Panzer Series

The following is a series of links serving as an index to my V Panzer / St. Vith series of posts. When complete, this wills serve as an e-book of sorts. I can foresee one weakness of this format will be orphaned links as time goes on but for those interested in military history and the discerning wargamer can enjoy this potentially ephemeral format as the samurai looked upon blossoming sakura.

Index

Part 1: Map with starting positions.
Part 2: 18th VG Division Advances.
Part 2: Fighting at Afst and Krewinkle.
Part 2: Fighting at Bleialf.
Part 3: Cannae in the Schnee Eifel
Part 4: German forces approach St. Vith
Part 4: Approaching St. Vith next day

Artillery:

      German - Report on Army Group B's General of the Artillery.

Medical care:

       U.S. - general and some Bulge related material. 

       German - general medical care and veterinary services for German infantry divisions.

Volks-Grenadiers.
       Kochen im Feld - Cooking in the Field

Weather chart during the Battle of the Bulge.

Geographic locations

Afst - fighting 16 Dec.
Bleialf - fighting 16 Dec.
Krewinkle - fighting 16 Dec.
Prumerberg Heights near St. Vith - defense by the 81st Engineers 17 - 21 Dec. Go to memorial section.
St. Vith
      - tour of the battlefield.

Units

U.S.

424th Infantry Regiment, 106th ID

German

18th Volks-grenadier Division

62nd Volks-grenadier Division

OOBs for both sides here (general). 

Personalities

Col. Thomas Riggs, 81st Engineers. 

     - obituary

     - defense at Prumerberg Heights near St. Vith

References (Publications)

A Time for Trumpets Charles B. Macdonald.
Battle of the Bulge, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944-1945 D.S. Parker. One of the main sources for Nafziger's OOB.
Das Heer 1933-1945, 1956 Vol I & II, Verband der Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS 1939-1945. Mueller-Hillebrand.  Cited by Nafziger.
Die Ardennen Offensive 1944-1945. H. Jung.  One of the main sources for Nafziger's OOB.
St. Vith: Lion in the Way, Ernest Dupuy. The 106th at the Battle of the Bulge. Paperback edition here. Note: there is a cheaper Kindle edition for 99 cents but does not contain maps or photos.
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge Hugh M. Cole.
The Battle of the Bulge, Charles B MacDonald. Cited by Nafziger on his OOB.
The 106th: The Story of the 106th Infantry Division .pdf file of 1945 U.S. Army pamphlet
Verband und Truppen der detuschen Wermacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945. G. Tessin.  Cited by Nafziger.
Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp, Douglas E. Nash. Detailed unit history of a Fusilier Company of the 272nd VG Regiment.  Best resource available on the Volks-Grenadiers.

References (Links)

14th Cavalry in the Losheim Gap
106th Infantry Division Association.  They have a reunion planed this September.
324th Medical Battalion.  Unit history. During the Bulge they were at Jalhay, Belgium, north of Malmedy.
424th Infantry Regiment, 106th Infantry Division. Personal account by Sgt Maurice Kunselman
     - first hand account of fighting from 23 to 30 December.
Battle of the Bulge Memories. Comprehensive web site from Belgium. Highly recommended.
Panzerworld Self explanatory.  Good info.
Project 1944. Military historians practicing "living history".
The 106th Infantry Division.  Nice section on the battlefield today.
WW2 Armed Forces OOBs and Organizations by Dr. Leo Niehorster. Not much available for the Bulge but otherwise, an excellent resource.

 

Related Games

A Time for Trumpets  GMT Games.  Board game.
Battles for the Ardennes SPI Games.  Board game. Four games in one.  Simulations of both the Bulge in 1944 and Sedan 1940.
Battle of the Bulge.  Shenandoah Studios. Computer Game. Available on Steam.
John Tiller's Campaign Series Matrix Games. Computer game.  Using a scenario from this game for this series of posts. Currently, on sale for $9.99!
Panzer Leader Avalon Hill. Board game.  Along with Panzerblitz (East Front) on of AH's best games.
The Ardennes Offensive SPI Games. Board game.
The Battle of the Bulge Avalon Hill. Board game.
The Blitz Wargame Club Eventual home for the updated (after this play test) V Panzer Army Campaign scenario.
Winter Thunder Tiny Battle Publishing. Operational level game designed by Brian Train.

Related Fiction

Fight to Survive: A Novel of the Battle of the Bulge, Book I, Steven Wheeler.

Behind Enemy Lines: A Novel of the Battle of the Bulge, Book II, Steven Wheeler.

Strategy and Tactics Magazine Variant for Avalon Hill's Battle of the Bulge Game

Screenshot from Strategy & Tactics' first magazine. The table below is from a variant of Avalon Hill's Battle of the Bulge game.  Even at the dawn of the hobby, folks were modding and striving for greater realism.

Of interest to this current series of posts are the factors given to the units:

• Each unit is the division (e.g. 106th Infantry Division).
• The unit is divided by regiments (i.e. the playing pieces). 
• Each playing piece is assigned a combat and movement factor (e.g. 293 VG Regiment 3-3).

The 18th VG Division's three regiments are rated  3-3 (3 combat / 3 movement factors).

The 62nd VG Division's three regiments are rated  3-3.

The Führerbegleitbrigade or Fuh. Es. Brigade rated 12-5.

The 106th Infantry Division three regiments are rated  5-4.

The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment rated 6-6.

My guess is that the ill fated 442 and 443 Infantry Regiments have higher combat factors than the VG regiments that decimated them is due to difference in artillery support available.

I am not familiar enough with the battle to guess why some of the VG regiments are rated over twice as effective (the 26th VG Division's regiment rated 7-3) than the regiments from the 18th and 62nd, both of which destroyed the 106th. The 26th was unable to take Bastogne but they may have been better equipped or closer to full compliment of personnel.  Something I'll look out for. My best guess is that both the 18th and 62nd VG Divisions were green.  One was formed the year before from Luftwaffe and naval personnel and the other was rebuilt after being destroyed in Russia.

I found this when looking for another S&T article in which a game designer listed the different data points that make up the abstract combat factors.

Battle of the Bulge: OOBs for the Battle of the Bulge

Below are copies from two of George Nafziger's OOBs.

The German OOB can be found under file  # 944GLAA and the American under 944ULAA:

German LXVI Corps

Notes from the original:
2 - The 18th VG Division was formed during 9/44 in Denmark from the cadre of a Luftwaffe field division and drafts from the Luftwaffe and Navy. At full strength and two months experience on the defensive in the Eifel.
3 - Numbers date from 12/1/44 and are "ist starke" (total), "Gefecht stärke" (action), and "Kampfstärke" (battle strength).
4 - 62nd VG Division rebuilt after being destroyed in Russia. Heavily composed of Polish and Czech conscripts who spoke no German.

And a couple of additional notes at the end of the document:

Jung provides a statement at the bottom of his return for 12/1/44 that indicates the "Ist staäke" (total strength) of a Type 44 infantry division would probably be at 54% (6,708 men) and that a Volksgrenadier division would probably be at 58% (6,410 men) of their total authorized strengths.

Note on Equipment:
Jung and Parker are frequently at odds about the numbers of tanks, sturmgeschutz, and guns assigned. Jung is using official records and appears to be more accurate, but there is no apparent reason as to why Parker indicates a Jagdpanzer IV and Jung indicates only heavy anti-tank guns (PAK).

Parker, D.S, Battle of the Bulge, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944-1945, 1991, Hong Kong, Combined Books Inc.

Jung, H., Die Ardenne Offensive 1944-1945, 1971, Frankfurt, Musterschmidt Gottingen.

American 106th Infantry Division

No notes.

Sources:

Stanton, S.L., Order of Battle, U.S.Army, World War II, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1984.

Parker, D.S, Battle of the Bulge, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944-1945, 1991, Hong Kong, Combined Books Inc.

Battle of the Bulge: 18th and 62nd VG Divisions Day 1

Intro

This post is the second in a series covering the advance on St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge.  This post will discuss the starting positions of the opposing forces and the terrain.

Start Map and Terrain

I have created the map below using satellite imagery. No doubt, there are differences from the 1944 battlefield but the hilly and wooded terrain remains relevant if you choose to drive, hike, or decide to invade Belgium with an mechanized force.

The blue line is the Google Maps direction feature for a vehicle between the key villages of Krewinkel, Weckerath,Manderfeld, Schönberg (and its vital bridge), then St. Vith. This is not necessarily the main axis of my intended advance but serves to give the reader an idea of the distance to be covered to the main victory point hexes at St. Vith.

The 18th Volksgrenadier (VG) Division is in the northeast corner of the map and scenario starting positions are show for its three regiments. The 62nd VG Division is concentrated just west of Prum on the bottom of the map. They are opposed by the 423rd Infantry Regiment.

Update 1/1/19: The bottom most VG Regiment, was actually the 183rd.

The 422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments were stretched thin across the front line and are in entrenched positions along a diagonal line between the two green regimental icons. They hold a good portion of the Schnee Eifel; the dark green wood covering a high ridge.

The Führerbegleit Brigade (Fuhrer Escort Brigade) lurks n the NE corner, ready to exploit any opportunity created by the VG regiments.

Hard to see unless you blow up the map but two red marks at Schönberg (middle of the blue line) and to the SW at Steinebrück designate vital bridges over the Our River. The Americans have many engineers available so it will be a race against time to take the bridges before they are blown.

My overall strategy is simple and has been dictated by the terrain. The 18th VG Division will attempt to get to the bridge at Schönberg the fastest with the mostest while the 62nd VG Division will push towards Schönberg and Steinebrück.

The blue car route on the map also gives a rough idea on the course of the Our River near Schönberg. On the game map the river is impassable to the east of Schönberg.  My engineers can build foot bridges but not vehicle bridges. If I send any armor to the north of that blue line from Manderfeld south west to Schönberg they will not be able to support any force south of the line until Schönberg is taken. There are fords in the town and elsewhere but the two bridges in red are key for relatively fast mechanized movement.

From Hugh M. Cole's book The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge a chapter on the initial dispositions of the 106th Infantry Division can be found here.

Update 1/7/2019: As research continues I discover differences between the scenario's start positions and the historical deployment.  For the map above the 424th Infantry Regiment was actually on the front line further to the south and not in St. Vith.  In the scenario the 422nd Infantry Regiment has about half the regiment stationed in the Losheim Gap, especially in vicinity of Roth. Actually, the 14th Armored Group was spread thin throughout the Losheim Gap and according to Charles B. MacDonald in A Time for Trumpets the Germans found an undefended area of more than a mile between Weckerath and Roth. A battalion of VGs pushed through this gap in the defense towards Auw, cutting off the defenders.  In the scenario there is at least a company of infantrymen in those woods who do a good job of holding back the attackers.

Next 

Orders of battle (OOB) for the forces involved and I hope to draft a side bar on the Volksgrenadiers. 

Massive Battle of the Bulge Scenario

As discussed in the CH Wargame Wednesday post play testing for the scenario was hampered by the lack of German mobility.  Something needed to be done as during game play the American side would always fall back in good order after inflicting heavy German casualties.  Eventually, the front line American regiments would succumb but they held their ground until American reinforcements arrived with the front stabilizing well to the east of Bastogne. 

The game engine and scenario conditions would not allow the German player a chance to repeat the historical outcome of two surrounded American regiments. I was able to find a U.S. Army Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory report titled Weather Effects During the Battle of the Bulge and Normandy Invasion by Marvin D. Kays.

Table 1 is copied below and allowed the scenario designer to adjust the weather conditions.  First day (6 turns) is foggy with limited visibility while the weather clears a little the 2nd day.

The amount of work needed to create the giant game map is phenomenal. Click on each picture below for a larger image. The map is at extreme zoom out and I've highlight German units by Corps so that they will stand out in red.

Here are the maps:

I'm playing the role of General Lucht and have the 66th Infantry Corps. This is the sector in which the Battle of St. Vith was fought. The Losheim Gap is in the NE part of the map.

The 58th Panzer Corps has the center:

And the 47th Panzer Corps has the south:

The map is so large that the American and German players taking the southern sector also have the road to Ettlebruck and the advance of the German paratroopers to consider: